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I. INTRODUCTION
From the vantage point of Summer 2020, 2019 seems almost a mirage. The
conditions created across Canada by government and individual responses to
COVID-19 were all but unimaginable when 2019 drew to a close, and the legal
issues that preoccupy those interested in constitutional and public law now revolve
around rapidly evolving rules and policies designed to protect public goods like
health and health care. Questions of profound signiﬁcance to constitutional lawyers,
such as the location of limits on state powers, the appropriate roles and relative
competencies of courts and governments, the place of state law in creating the good
life, and how to think about the nature of a public/private divide, are all in play on
a daily basis in late Summer 2020. Yet, many of us do not have time to reﬂect on
them, caught up as we are in the complexities of work life and family life during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. With deep thanks to Faiza Tariq for
superlative research assistance, and many thanks for the advice and camaraderie of my
co-convenors of the 2020 version of Osgoode Hall Law School’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference, Professors Benjamin Berger and Emily Kidd White. The conference was
scheduled for April 6, 2020 and cancelled due to COVID-19. I am profoundly grateful to all
the authors of pieces in this volume, who persevered with their contributions despite losing
out on the delights of the conference itself.
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Looking back always offers advantages that were unavailable in the moment. We
can see patterns, perhaps, that were not visible as situations were unfolding. We
have the beneﬁt of more time to reﬂect and see things that we originally did not. We
have the beneﬁt of being able to bring together thoughts at the time and thoughts that
crystallized only in time. The strangeness of this looking back is that — much more
than any other broadly shared moment that I have experienced — it seems from this
vantage point that we are looking back at a Before from an After.1
The construction of Befores and Afters will also affect analysis, and may both
produce insights and induce fallacy in the same ways that historiographers warn us
about. Now in the After, urgent legal matters continue to arise across the country —
perhaps even more than usual — but some of the Supreme Court’s work has ground
to a halt. Cases scheduled for hearings in March, April and May 2020 were
adjourned — tentatively — to June 2020.2 As June drew closer with little hope of
the pandemic easing, Chief Justice Wagner took the opportunity to modernize the
justice system. As a result, the ﬁrst-ever video hearing was held in June 2020.3 Last
year, we foresaw none of this. For all the surprises and disappointments that a year
of decisions must produce, everything proceeded in quite an orderly fashion.
Decisions were made. Judgments were written and released. Hearings were held. It
was the Before, and things were normal.
Still, when we were in 2019, we did not treat it as some generic “before”
undifferentiated from any time other than March 2020 and after. We were conscious
of being in the early years of the “Wagner Court”. We saw the release of the former
Chief Justice McLachlin’s autobiography. Justice Clément Gascon retired and was
replaced by Justice Nicholas Kasirer. The Court decamped en masse to Winnipeg to
hold a hearing. Through all this, the justices ground through the usual, ordinary set
of very important cases.
This brief effort to summarize the year “before” will obviously fall short. But it
starts with a brief tour of some of the jurisprudence, much of it taken up in greater
detail by the authors of other pieces in this volume. I focus instead on the agreement
and disagreement among members of the Court. I then move to consider three
particular aspects of 2019: a road trip, a new report and the circumstances of a
retirement. My analysis of these events is an effort to understand the ways the Court
wants to be more open to some version of the public, and an attempt to raise
questions about the implications of the Supreme Court’s methods.
1
Others will have different experiences, of course. Here I am reﬂecting on my own
history, which involved immigration to Canada in the 1970s and life in Toronto since.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, “Notice about COVID-19”, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/
court-cour/notice-avis-COVID-19-eng.aspx>
 (retrieved: August 27, 2020).
3

Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C.,
Chief Justice of Canada, “The Court’s ﬁrst-ever hearing fully by video-conference” (June 9,
2020), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/rw-2020-06-09-eng.aspx>.
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II. THE DECISIONS AND

THE

DECISION-MAKERS

The Court issued 67 decisions in 2019.4 For the purposes of this paper, I have
labelled 19 of these “constitutional” decisions and considered them in this brief
numerical tour.5 Three were division of powers cases (one of which revolved around
4

Supreme Court of Canada, 2019 Year in Review, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/reviewrevue/2019/index-eng.aspx>.

5

The complete list of cases: Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1,
2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bird, [2019] S.C.J. No. 7, 2019 SCC 7 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrison,
[2019] S.C.J. No. 15, 2019 SCC 15 (S.C.C.); R. v. Myers, [2019] S.C.J. No. 18, 2019 SCC
18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22 (S.C.C.); Canada (Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness) v. Chhina, [2019] S.C.J. No. 29, 2019 SCC 29 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Chhina”]; R. v. Le, [2019] S.C.J. No. 34, 2019 SCC 34 (S.C.C.); R. v. Stillman,
[2019] S.C.J. No. 40, 2019 SCC 40 (S.C.C.); Fleming v. Ontario, [2019] S.C.J. No. 45, 2019
SCC 45 (S.C.C.); R. v. Poulin, [2019] S.C.J. No. 47, 2019 SCC 47 (S.C.C.); Orphan Well
Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5 (S.C.C.)[hereinafter “Orphan
Wells”]; R. v. James, [2019] S.C.J. No. 52, 2019 SCC 52 (S.C.C.); R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019]
S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55 (S.C.C.); Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc.,
[2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Desgagnés”]; Canada (Attorney
General) v. British Columbia Investment Management Corp., [2019] S.C.J. No. 63, 2019
SCC 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “British Columbia Investment Management Corp.”]; Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65
(S.C.C.); Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 66, 2019 SCC 66
(S.C.C.); Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, [2019] S.C.J. No. 67,
2019 SCC 67 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada Post”]; R. v. Omar, [2019] S.C.J. No. 32, 2019
SCC 32 (S.C.C.). I did make line calls that some readers will no doubt dispute. For instance,
my list includes Chhina, in which the main issue is habeas corpus without signiﬁcant
reference to the Constitution. It does not include R. v. Barton, [2019] S.C.J. No. 33, 2019 SCC
33 (S.C.C.), in which a variety of Charter rights are or may be at stake: the equality rights of
the victim, the accused’s right to full answer and defence since these issues were not
particularly engaged by the writers. It does not include R. v. Goldﬁnch, [2019] S.C.J. No. 38,
2019 SCC 38 (S.C.C.) or R. v. V. (R.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 41, 2019 SCC 41 (S.C.C.), both of
which also considered the proper approach to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46 and its restriction of the use of the complainant’s prior sexual history by the defence.
It does not include Denis v. Côté, [2019] S.C.J. No. 44, 2019 SCC 44 (S.C.C.), in which the
Court deals with a subpoena served on a journalist, and in doing so mentions the way in which
s. 2(b) “includes freedom of the press” (at para. 46). I have included the Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65 (S.C.C.)
administrative law “trilogy” (which for the purposes of this accounting constitutes two cases,
as Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 66, 2019 SCC 66 (S.C.C.)
contains both Bell and the NFL case), as well as Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of
Postal Workers, [2019] S.C.J. No. 67, 2019 SCC 67 (S.C.C.), despite the fact that these cases
tend to fall generally into public law and are more questionable as constitutional law (the
counter argument is that these cases are about the constitutional role of judicial review). I
removed R. v. Blanchard, [2019] S.C.J. No. 9, 2019 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) because the Court
indicates the case was not a constitutional case (the Crown conceded the availability of the
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section 125 of the Constitution rather than sections 91 and 92) and three were
administrative law cases. One dealt with section 3, the right to vote. The remainder
falls into the category of constitutional criminal law, under section 7, sections 11(d),
11(e), 11(f), 11(i), and section 8 (and of course, some of these cases included
multiple claims). There were no cases dealing with section 35 of the Constitution
and none with the fundamental freedoms under section 2. Neither were there any
dealing with equality (whether these absences are signiﬁcant in terms of the Court’s
caseload requires a much broader consideration than undertaken here).
In this set of 19 cases, the appellants were successful 11 times. The Crown won
seven of these cases and lost six, although for these numbers I have excluded from
consideration Orphan Wells, Desgagnés, British Columbia Investment Management
Corp., Vavilov, Bell and NFL and Canada Post since it is difficult to determine the
box into which each should go. The federal government received a signiﬁcant
infusion of tax revenue from the outcome in British Columbia Investment Management Corp., but British Columbia had participated in that case, also arguing that the
monies were payable to the federal government. Alberta looks successful in Orphan
Wells, as does Quebec in Desgagnés, and in both cases, the federal government did
not intervene. Maybe we could count these in a provincial win category but surely
not the federal loss category. We might also count them as wins for “public”
regulation of private enterprise or private property. Finally, the overturning of
decisions of administrative tribunals in Vavilov and Bell and NFL might be counted
as losses to the federal government, which had delegated power to those tribunals,
but the question of what, exactly, the legislature intended in those delegations was
after all at the heart of those cases, so I leave them out of this accounting. Canada
Post I ﬁnd the most difficult to categorize on these terms.6 Remedially, both Frank
defence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism, but Brown J. wrote for the panel of nine
“we expressly refrain from deciding the availability of this defence in the absence of an
adequate record on the constitutional issues, full submissions and notice to the proper
parties”), but of course declining to consider the constitutional issues was an important
decision. I included R. v. Myers, in which the Court sets out the proper approach to s. 525 of
the Criminal Code, because the reasons lightly and infrequently refer to s. 11 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”] (“Today, the right not to
be denied reasonable bail without just cause, which is enshrined in s. 11(e) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, operates as a key organizing principle of Part XVI of the
Criminal Code”: R. v. Myers, [2019] S.C.J. No. 18, 2019 SCC 18, at para. 25 (S.C.C.)). I
included decisions from the bench if constitutional issues were clearly engaged (e.g., R. v.
Omar; R. v. James). Delightfully endless debates of relatively little consequence are possible
about these choices and categories. What is clear is that the unanimity rate, at least, will
ﬂuctuate considerably depending on the position the analyst takes.
6

In this post-Vavilov reasonableness review case, a Health and Safety officer had
determined the employer did not comply with s. 125(1)(z.12) of the Canada Labour Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. L‑2. An appeals officer rescinded the contravention: 2014 OHSTC 22. The
Federal Court dismissed the union’s application for judicial review: [2016] F.C.J. No. 272,
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and Morrison saw section 52 invoked to render legislation “of no force and effect”.7
Compared to past years, court-watchers might be interested to see that the rate of
unanimity has dropped even further when all the Court’s cases are considered, to 42
per cent from last year’s 48 per cent.8 In the 19 cases considered here, 12 included
dissents, two had only partial dissents, three included concurrences but no dissents,
and two were unanimous. Again, without more numbers, this might not be a helpful
statistic. Is the rate of unanimity meaningful? If it is, is it meaningful that the rate
for these “constitutional” cases is so much lower (on the Supreme Court’s own
metric this would produce a unanimity rate of 26 per cent for this group of cases).9
Some things do seem to have changed. In 2018, Jamie Cameron’s review
highlighted a team of dissenting justices: Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.10 However, in
2019, this team was less prominent in the cases considered. They came together in
Bird, Morrison and Myers, as well as Fleming, Vavilov and Canada Post. It may be
that some more convergence would have happened had they sat on more cases
together, but Rowe J. was on just 14 of the 19 panels, and Côté J. on 16.11 Justice
2016 FC 252 (F.C.). The Federal Court of Appeal reinstated the original decision of the
Health and Safety Officer: [2017] F.C.J. No. 708, 2017 FCA 153 (F.C.A.). The Supreme
Court allowed the appeal and reinstated the decision of the appeals officer. The employer,
ultimately, is successful in this case.
7

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1, at para. 83
(S.C.C.) (“Accordingly, based on s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 222(1) (b) and (c),
223(1)(f) and 226(f) of the Act are declared to be of no force or effect; the words ‘a person
who has been absent from Canada for less than ﬁve consecutive years and who intends to
return to Canada as a resident’ are struck from s. 11(d) of the Act and are replaced with the
words ‘an elector who resides outside Canada’; and the word ‘temporarily’ is struck from ss.
220, 222(1) and 223(1)(e) of the Act”); R. v. Morrison, [2019] S.C.J. No. 15, 2019 SCC 15,
at para. 157 (S.C.C.) (“[s. 172.1(3)] of the Code ... infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter, and that
infringement cannot be saved under s. 1. It is therefore without force or effect pursuant to s.
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982”). Mr. Morrison was sent back for another trial.
8
Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C.,
Chief Justice of Canada, “The Court’s ﬁrst-ever hearing fully by video-conference” (June 9,
2020), at 35, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/rw-2020-06-09-eng.
aspx>.

9

The Supreme Court’s own report counts as “unanimous” all cases in which “all judges
agree on the outcome (the practical effect for the parties involved), not on their reasons for
that outcome. A ‘unanimous’ judgment may therefore have more than one set of reasons”.
Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C., Chief
Justice of Canada, “The Court’s ﬁrst-ever hearing fully by video-conference” (June 9, 2020),
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/rw-2020-06-09-eng.aspx>.
 I replicated
that operationalization here, without endorsing it.
10

Professor Jamie Cameron, “A Chief and Court in Transition: The Wagner Court and the
Constitution” (2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3.
11

Justices Rowe and Côté diverged only on Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019]
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Brown wrote reasons in eight of these cases (he was part of all 19 counted in this
article) but seven of the eight were co-written (all but the majority reasons in Mills).
With Côté J., yes, in Frank, but also with Martin J. in Le, Moldaver J. in Stillman,
Wagner C.J.C. in Desgagnés (joint concurring reasons) and Abella J. (joint
dissenting reasons) in M. (K.J.). He was part of the majority reasons (listed as jointly
written by all the judges involved) in Vavilov and Bell and NFL. When he was not
writing, Brown J. signed on to the Karakatsanis J. authored majority in British
Columbia Investment Management Corp., the Rowe J. authored majority in Canada
Post, dissented alongside Abella, Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. in James, with
Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. in Omar (the latter two were dealt with in oral reasons),
and with Karakatsanis and Abella JJ. in Poulin.
Writing more often alone, Karakatsanis J. wrote in the same number of cases
(eight) as Brown J. Only two of these were jointly written.12 She wrote the majority
reasons in Chhina and British Columbia Investment Management Corp., a set of
concurring reasons in Morrison, another in Mills, joint concurring reasons with
Abella J. in Vavilov, joint dissenting reasons with Abella J. in Bell and NFL and a
dissent in Poulin. Justice Moldaver also wrote in eight cases. Four were jointly
authored. He was the sole author of the majority reasons in Bird and M. (K.J.), a
one-paragraph concurrence in Mills, and the dissent in Le (where he was joined by
the Chief Justice). Furthermore, on the set of 2019 cases considered here, there is
nothing remarkable about Côté J.’s record of dissenting — as a percentage it is lower
than the rates racked up by Abella, Brown, Karakatsanis and Martin JJ.
Of course, I now must make the point that absent a broad quantitative and
searching quantitative analysis, this kind of counting, bounded so artiﬁcially in time
and in substance, is but a playful pastime for dedicated court-watchers. Only a
deeper analysis could help us identify whether a judge has started appearing in the
S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Stillman, [2019] S.C.J. No. 40, 2019 SCC 40
(S.C.C.) (in which Rowe J. dissented). Justices Brown and Rowe were at odds in Frank v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) (Brown J. dissenting),
R. v. Stillman, [2019] S.C.J. No. 40, 2019 SCC 40 (S.C.C.) (Brown J. wrote the majority,
Rowe J. dissented), R. v. James, [2019] S.C.J. No. 52, 2019 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) (oral reasons,
Brown J. dissented), R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) (Brown J.
dissented), Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., [2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019
SCC 58 (S.C.C.) (Rowe and Côté JJ. wrote the majority reasons, Brown J. co-wrote a
concurrence with the Chief Justice) and R. v. Omar, [2019] S.C.J. No. 32, 2019 SCC 32
(S.C.C.) (oral reasons, Brown J. dissented). Justices Côté and Brown diverged on R. v. Poulin,
[2019] S.C.J. No. 47, 2019 SCC 47 (S.C.C.), Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd.,
[2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5 (S.C.C.), R. v. James, [2019] S.C.J. No. 52, 2019 SCC 52
(S.C.C.) (oral reasons), R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55 (S.C.C.),
Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., [2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019 SCC 58
(S.C.C.) and R. v. Omar, [2019] S.C.J. No. 32, 2019 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) (oral reasons).
12
This is not a comment on how much work was done, only on the extent to which judges
engage in joint writing projects.
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majority more often because they have changed their own positions, because they
have become more conciliatory and likely to compromise and come to consensus,
because the cases are raising very different issues (which might indicate that leave
practices are changing), or because other members of the Court are now more likely
to share their views. At best we can ask whether something is or is not a trend if it
seems to happen frequently — or we might be able to cast some light on similar
questions asked in past years. On that latter point, it does seem worth pointing to
clear indications that allies and opponents form and reform around different points
of agreement and disagreement on this Court. Justices Abella and Karakatsanis
co-write in the administrative law cases, but Abella J. dissents against the
Karakatsanis J.–written majority reasons in Chhina. The “ﬂashes of attitude” noted
by Jamie Cameron in last year’s review in the Brown, Rowe and Côté JJ. dissents
did not block Abella and Brown JJ. from writing together in M. (K.J.).13 It is
possible that the zones of agreement between judges usually divided are at least as
interesting — if not more so — than their divergences.
III. DIVISION

OF

POWERS/FEDERALISM CASES

To continue the theme of misleading numbers, even though none of the three
cases this year in which the Court considered the meaning of the Constitution in our
federal system, the outcome did not oust provincial legislation. These cases do serve
to illustrate some of the fault lines on the Court. The sharp dissent from Côté and
Moldaver JJ. in Orphan Wells puts some emphasis on statutory interpretation as well
as potentially unwanted extra-legal outcomes of the majority decision. There is a
mild disagreement leading to a concurrence in Desgagnés, and a partial dissent from
the Chief Justice, writing alone and taking a purposive approach over a technical one
in British Columbia Investment Management Corp.
Orphan Wells (sometimes known as Redwater) is of interest to both those curious
about bankruptcy law and those focused on environmental matters. The majority
found no conﬂict (and hence no operation of federal paramountcy) between the
federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act14 and the obligations placed on licensees
under Alberta’s comprehensive licensing regime regarding reclamation of any
abandoned wells. The dissent of Moldaver and Côté JJ. turns on the interpretation
of section 14.06(4) of the BIA, which, according to them, “assumes . . . the
common law power of trustees to disclaim assets”.15 Justices Moldaver and Côté
repeatedly call on the majority to have attention to this interpretation (they do not),
which the dissent supports with the words of a Director in the Department of
Industry who had been involved in the drafting: “we must give effect to this choice
13
Professor Jamie Cameron, “A Chief and Court in Transition: The Wagner Court and the
Constitution” (2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at para. 14.
14

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter “BIA”].

15

Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5, at para.
195 (S.C.C.), per Moldaver and Côté JJ., dissenting.

7

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

and to the words that Parliament has used.”16 The dissent concludes on a sharp note
which makes clear that they do not think there is any reasonable dissent from the
position they have taken on interpretation:
[I]n matters of statutory interpretation this Court is one of law, not of policy. . . .
“it is not the role of this Court to decide the best regulatory approach to the oil and
gas industry”; decisions on these matters are made — indeed, they have been made
— by legislators, not judges. And the law in this case supports only one outcome.17

These words recall Jamie Cameron’s discussion last year in these pages of the
tone decisions have taken, about which she sounded a cautionary note. In that
regard, the majority decision is far from incomprehensible in light of existing
jurisprudence, particularly given the increasing reference to cooperative federalism
in this kind of case at the Court.18
Much later in the year, the Court released a decision in Desgagnés Transport Inc.
v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., which similarly employs judicial restraint to prevent the
erosion of provincial authority.19 When parts in a ship’s engine failed, the question
became the law under which the contract dispute would be adjudicated, since the
contract did not say — Quebec law or maritime law?20 These two choices would
distribute multi-million-dollar burdens in diametrically opposite ways. The relevant
heads of power are the navigation and shipping power of the federal government,
and the civil rights powers of the province, with maritime law also in play (not a
head of power, but certainly a complicating and important factor). Framing the
matter as “the sale of marine engine parts intended for use on a commercial
vessel”,21 the majority saw a true double aspect to the matter. As Hanley and Pierce
discuss in their contribution to this volume, the majority decision does seem to clear
up lingering questions about maritime law and division of powers stemming from
how Ordon Estate v. Grail22 was to be treated after Canadian Western Bank v.
16
Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5, at para.
199 (S.C.C.), per Moldaver and Côté JJ., dissenting.
17
Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5, at para.
290 (S.C.C.), per Moldaver and Côté JJ., dissenting [emphasis in original].
18

Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5, at paras.
185-186 (S.C.C.), per Moldaver and Côté JJ., dissenting.
19

Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “The Supreme Court on Federalism, Bankruptcy and Maritime
Law” in this volume writes “It was also raised in Desgagnés, where restraint was cited as
necessary to avoid the erosion of provincial authority”.
20

Sean Hanley & Sean Pierce, “Of Dominant Tides: Desgagnés Transport Inc. v.
Wärtsilä Canada Inc. and the Growing Acceptance of Provincial Jurisdiction in Maritime
Matters”, in this volume.
21

Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., [2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019 SCC 58,
at para. 23 (S.C.C.).
22

[1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 (S.C.C.).
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Alberta,23 which laid down rules limiting the use of federal interjurisdictional
immunity.24 Finally, as pointed out by Ben-Ishai’s treatment in this volume, the
majority used “the principles of cooperative federalism” in holding that provincial
law (in this case, Quebec contract law) prevailed.25
British Columbia Investment Management Corp. is the last of the cases in this
section, and it is a bit of an odd one, since it concerns section 125 of the Constitution
Act.26 At issue was whether the British Columbia Investment Management
Corporation (BCI) had to pay collect and remit GST on the costs of making
investments. The investments were made by BCI in its role as provider of
investment management services to the province’s public sector pension plans along
with other Crown entities (in fulﬁlling these duties, BCI became, in 2013, the
fourth-largest pension fund manager in Canada). Under the federal Excise Tax Act,27
BCI should have been collecting GST on investment management fees and remitting
it to the federal government. But for a large number of funds, BCI was recovering
management costs on the assets and not collecting or remitting taxes.28 Also
complicating the case were intergovernmental agreements entered into by British
Columbia and the federal government, the Reciprocal Taxation Agreement and the
2009 Comprehensive Integrated Tax Coordination Agreement.
The ﬁrst issue was whether section 125 of the Constitution Act applied to these
funds.29 With the GST clearly constituting taxation, the question here was simply
whether “the subject matter of the tax must be property belonging to the . . .
provincial Crown” for section 125 to apply in this case.30 While the majority
interpreted the Excise Tax Act in a technical manner, and found that it did not apply
to the portfolios held by BCI, the Chief Justice, writing alone in dissent, took a far
more purposive approach to section 125. He ﬁxated on the jurisprudence which
23

[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).

24

See Sean Hanley & Sean Pierce, “Of Dominant Tides: Desgagnés Transport Inc. v.
Wärtsilä Canada Inc. and the Growing Acceptance of Provincial Jurisdiction in Maritime
Matters” in this volume.
25
See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “The Supreme Court on Federalism, Bankruptcy and
Maritime Law” in this volume.
26

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 125, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11: “No Lands or Property belonging to Canada or any Province shall be liable to
Taxation.”
27

R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15.

28

Canada (Attorney General) v. British Columbia Investment Management Corp., [2019]
S.C.J. No. 63, 2019 SCC 63, at para. 16 (S.C.C.).
29
Canada (Attorney General) v. British Columbia Investment Management Corp., [2019]
S.C.J. No. 63, 2019 SCC 63, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).
30

Canada (Attorney General) v. British Columbia Investment Management Corp., [2019]
S.C.J. No. 63, 2019 SCC 63, at para. 68 (S.C.C.).
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listed two main purposes for the section: protection of federalism and democracy
promotion.31 Taking these purposes as paramount, he argued that a “substance over
form” argument should prevent the mechanism by which BCI was collecting fees
from governing whether or not the fees were subject to federal tax. Ultimately, the
Chief Justice agreed with the others that the intergovernmental agreements bound
BCI to pay the tax regardless — but the gap between the two approaches to applying
section 125 seems quite signiﬁcant.
In these division of powers cases, the Court continues to promote forms of
ﬂexible federalism and to value cooperative arrangements between the provinces
and the federal government. There is no about-turn in the jurisprudence; rather, there
is some clariﬁcation.32 One fact seems to warrant attention: the federal government
did not participate as an intervener in either Orphan Wells or Desgagnés. There have
been many arguments about the signiﬁcance of a province or the federal government
intervening or not intervening to “protect” or “claim” jurisdiction. In Orphan Wells,
the federal government declined to participate in a way that would have supported
Grant Thornton in avoiding the strictures of Alberta environmental protections. In
Desgagnés, the federal government declined to participate in a way that would have
allowed Wärtsilä the beneﬁt of maritime law (not, after all, legislation passed by the
Canadian parliament but rather a complex body of custom and common law) rather
than Quebec law. As the Court continues to champion ﬂexible and cooperative
federalism in its language and in outcomes, we might keep an eye on what happens
in division of powers cases in which one government does not participate, versus
those in which both are engaged, as well as the implications in any struggle for
resources between the public and the private sphere.
IV. CHARTER RIGHTS (NON-CRIMINAL CASES)
One of this year’s hotly anticipated cases was the ﬁrst constitutional case
released: Frank, in which Canadian citizens who had been non-resident for ﬁve
years challenged the Canada Elections Act33 prohibition on voting in federal
elections for those in similar positions. As discussed by both Dawood and Weinrib
(who focuses on the dissent) in this volume, the majority fairly easily found a
violation of the democratic right under section 334 and most of the action took place
31

Canada (Attorney General) v. British Columbia Investment Management Corp., [2019]
S.C.J. No. 63, 2019 SCC 63, at paras. 144 and 145 (S.C.C.), Wagner C.J.C. in partial dissent
(“representatives at one level of government to determine how to spend taxes . . . levied [by
the other]”).
32

See Sean Hanley & Sean Pierce, “Of Dominant Tides: Desgagnés Transport Inc. v.
Wärtsilä Canada Inc. and the Growing Acceptance of Provincial Jurisdiction in Maritime
Matters”, in this volume (pinpoint to sentence beginning “While this might seem uncontroversial”).
33

S.C. 2000, c. 9.

34

The federal government conceded this violation, which raises other concerns about the
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under section 1.35 The Chief Justice wrote the 5-2 majority decision, holding that the
legislation failed the section 1 test at minimal impairment,36 while commenting
negatively but not deciding on the argument at rational connection.37 Justice Rowe
concurred, expressing concern about the possible relevance of residence to section
3, which he thought was given short shrift in the majority. The big surprise in Frank
was how Côté and Brown JJ. in dissent pushed for a (radically) new approach to
section 1 that would be considerably more deferential to Parliament.
As Weinrib notes, the interpretation of Côté and Brown JJ. is ignored in the
majority decision, described as “largely semantic” and a “departure from decades of
Charter jurisprudence, [which] neither raised nor argued at any stage of these
proceedings and ... need not be considered in order to dispose of this appeal”.38
However, the sheer novelty of the approach to the text and meaning of section 1
does suggest a close watch of Côté and Brown JJ. in future outings of section 1
outside the criminal law context (recall that there were no other such cases this
year). Given their radical departure from past (and current majority) positions, the
far more expansive role granted to Parliament in terms of deﬁning rights they offer,
and the deferential stance set up by these commitments, we can assume that these
views will continue to animate both justices in their deliberations and reasoning.
V. CRIMINAL/CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In Le and Fleming, the Court acted to rein in police actions. The very close
decision in Le, covered in this volume by Khoday, has majority reasons by Brown
and Martin JJ. The decision is notable for the way that, as Khoday puts it, Brown
and Martin JJ. have “explicitly written race into the story of psychological
detentions” in contrast to past cases, especially R. v. Grant in 2009.39 Fleming is a
bit out of place here, since it is not truly a criminal case. It arose out of Fleming’s
s. 1 analysis familiar from s. 2(b) cases: Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J.
No. 1, 2019 SCC 1, at para. 4 (S.C.C.).
35

See Yasmin Dawood, “The Right to Vote and Freedom of Expression in Political
Process Cases Under the Charter” and Jacob Weinrib, “The Frank Dissent’s Novel Theory of
the Charter: The Rhetoric and the Reality”, in this volume.
36

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1, at para. 65
(S.C.C.).
37

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1, at para. 60
(S.C.C.).
38
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1, at para. 41
(S.C.C.).
39
See Amar Khoday, “Ending the Erasure?: Writing Race into the Story of Psychological
Detentions – Examining R. v. Le” in this volume at; R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 2009
SCC 32 (S.C.C.) (as Khoday writes, “Save for Binnie J.’s consideration of race in his
concurrence, the Grant majority’s treatment of race is conspicuous by its absence”). See also
Danardo S. Jones, “Lifting the Judicial Embargo on Race-Based Charter Litigation: A
Comment on R. v. Le” (2019) 67(1&2) Crim. L.Q. 42.
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tort suit against the Ontario Provincial Police claiming “general damages for assault
and battery, wrongful arrest, and false imprisonment, as well as aggravated or
punitive damages and damages for violation of his rights under ss. 2(b), 7, 9 and 15
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.40 Justice Côté wrote the reasons
(a dissenter no longer, perhaps), joined by the other six members of the panel,
declining to follow the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision to recognize a “new
common law police power to preventatively arrest a law-abiding individual in order
to protect them from harm by third parties”, as discussed by Skolnik and
MacDonnell in this volume.41 Both Le and Fleming seem likely to have practical
signiﬁcance in the contemporary context, given ongoing and increasing concerns
about over-policing of racial minorities and given some hints that we may be
experiencing an increase in public protest.
Against the notion that Le and Fleming are a trend, however, the Court in Omar
issued a very short oral decision (Brown, Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. dissenting)
allowing the appeal “substantially for the reasons of Brown J.A. at the Court of
Appeal”42 and suggesting the possibility of remedies other than exclusion under
section 24. The dissenters based their position on the reasons of Sharpe J.A. in the
court below and suggested in their turn: “It may be that consideration should be
given to whether the police should caution persons that they stop and question that
such persons need not remain or answer questions, but the dissenters would leave
this for another day.”43 One potentially important fact: Omar is another young Black
man stopped, questioned and searched on little to no evidence.44 The Brown,
Karakatsanis and Martin trio had written the majority in Le against dissenters
Wagner C.J.C. and Moldaver J., but lost the lead when Côté and Rowe JJ. were
added to the group for Omar. Both voted to allow the appeal.
Mills is another case with obvious contemporary resonance. In Mills, only Martin
J. took the position that section 8 was engaged by a police sting investigation which
led to Mills being charged with child luring. Despite the efforts of the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, and the SamuelsonGlushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Mr. Mills’s internet
messages to a child (actually, a police officer posing as a child online) were not
40

Fleming v. Ontario, [2019] S.C.J. No. 45, 2019 SCC 45, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).

41

See Terry Skolnik & Vanessa MacDonnell, “Policing Arbitrariness: Fleming v. Ontario
and the Ancillary Powers Doctrine” in this volume.
42

R. v. Omar, [2019] S.C.J. No. 32, 2019 SCC 32, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).

43

R. v. Omar, [2019] S.C.J. No. 32, 2019 SCC 32, at para. 2 (S.C.C.).

44

The panel which heard R. v. Le at the Ontario Court of Appeal was comprised of
Doherty, Brown and Lauwers JJ.A. (see [2018] O.J. No. 359, 2018 ONCA 56 (Ont. C.A.)).
The panel that heard R. v. Omar consisted of Sharpe, Paciocco and Brown JJ.A. (see [2018]
O.J. No. 6346, 2018 ONCA 975 (Ont. C.A.)). Justice Brown was in the majority on Le, but
dissented on Omar. In both cases, the majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal was
overturned.
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treated as private. Justice Brown, joined by Abella and Gascon JJ., wrote the
majority decision, holding that the objective reasonableness of subjective expectations of privacy required a normative inquiry focused on “when Canadians ought to
expect privacy, given the applicable considerations”.45 For this group, the signiﬁcance of the context rests on the fact that a child is involved, and that the
communication medium is the Internet:
This Court has recognized that children are especially vulnerable to sexual crimes;
that the Internet allows for greater opportunities to sexually exploit children; and
that enhancing protection to children from becoming victims of sexual offences is
vital in a free and democratic society. . . . [O]n the normative standard of
expectations of privacy described by this Court, adults cannot reasonably expect
privacy online with children they do not know. That the communication occurs
online does not add a layer of privacy, but rather a layer of unpredictability.46

Justice Karakatsanis, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote concurring reasons
focused on the fact that the police were communicating in writing with Mills. This
led to the conclusion that there was no search or seizure: “Email and Facebook
messenger users are not only aware that a permanent written record of their
communication exists, they actually create the record themselves.”47 This concurrence dismissed the concern of the Criminal Lawyers’ Association that “not
applying s. 8 in the present case opens the door to the police posing as internet
therapy providers or even creating their own dating service in an effort to monitor
the addictions or sexual preferences of Canadians”, saying instead that the correct
approach to any future situations where “police impersonation tactics offend
society’s notions of decency and fair play” will involve courts using tools other than
section 8 to push back.48 Justice Moldaver, unable to pick a favourite between the
majority and the concurrence, simply said: “[E]ach set of reasons is sound in law
and each forms a proper basis for . . . dismissing Mr. Mills’ appeal.”49
Only Martin J. walked the difficult path of recognizing the signiﬁcance of online
sexual exploitation and calling for checks on state surveillance (a task which
rendered her reasons more than twice as long as those of Brown J.).50 The
conﬁguration of this appeal is thus something like 3:2:1:1, a decision that is difficult
45

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [emphasis in
original].
46

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [citations omitted].

47

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 48 (S.C.C.), Karakatsanis J.,
concurring.
48

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at paras. 61, 63 (S.C.C.), Karakatsanis
J., concurring.
49
R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 66 (S.C.C.), Moldaver J.,
concurring.
50
R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 72 (S.C.C.), Martin J.,
concurring in the result.
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to rely on in a critically important area of legal, social and technological change.
Justice Martin framed the question as follows:
... At the end of the Cold War era, the way to obtain a real-time record of a
conversation was to record it. Today, the way to obtain a real-time record of a
conversation is simply to engage in that conversation. . . . Should this shift in
communication technology now allow the state to access people’s private online
conversations at its sole discretion and thereby threaten our most cherished privacy
principles?51

Justice Martin speciﬁcally rejects the decision of the majority that the nature of
the relationship in question here (an adult, and a child who is a perfect stranger to
the adult) diminishes the privacy expectations. Later, having found that screen
capture also violated section 8, she pushed the reasonableness question back to the
legislature: “The question as to what standard of reasonableness would be required
for prior judicial authorization of varied forms of proactive police investigations is
one best left to Parliament.”52 Even Martin J. thought the evidence did not need to
be excluded under section 24(2).
The child-luring provisions of the Criminal Code under which Mr. Mills had been
charged were the subject of the decision in Morrison. Mr. Morrison claimed certain
provisions of section 172.1 violated the Charter, speciﬁcally that section 172.1(3)
violated section 11(d) and that section 172.1(4) violated section 7:
172.1 (3) Evidence that the person referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) was
represented to the accused as being under the age of eighteen years, sixteen years
or fourteen years, as the case may be, is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
proof that the accused believed that the person was under that age.
(4) It is not a defence to a charge under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c) that the accused
believed that the person referred to in that paragraph was at least eighteen years of
age, sixteen years or fourteen years of age, as the case may be, unless the accused
took reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the person.

Morrison also argued that the mandatory minimum contained in section 172.1(2)(a)
of the Criminal Code violated section 12. The majority agreed that section 172.1(3)
violated section 11(d) and could not be saved under section 1, striking it down under
section 52. On this point, both Abella and Martin JJ. agreed. However, the majority
also held that the reasonable steps requirement under section 172.1(4) did not violate
section 7, but merely limited the accused’s access to an affirmative defence, leading
to Abella J.’s partial dissent. Finally, the majority sent the challenge to the
mandatory minimum back to the trial judge, “should Mr. Morrison be convicted
again”,53 a solution rejected by Karakatsanis J., who would have found the
51

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 89 (S.C.C.), Martin J.,
concurring in the result [emphasis in original].
52

R. v. Mills, [2019] S.C.J. No. 22, 2019 SCC 22, at para. 146 (S.C.C.).

53

R. v. Morrison, [2019] S.C.J. No. 15, 2019 SCC 15, at para. 145 (S.C.C.).
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sentencing provision violated section 12 and could not be saved by section 1.
In the last criminal/constitutional case considered here, M. (K.J.), the Court
considered how the presumptive ceilings set out in 2016’s R. v. Jordan54 should
apply in the context of charges under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.55 Everyone
claims to agree that there is an “enhanced need for timeliness in youth matters”.56
After that, though, three distinct positions emerge.
Justice Moldaver, who co-wrote the majority reasons in Jordan, again wrote the
majority (joined by Wagner C.J.C., Gascon, Côté and Rowe JJ.), holding that,
without any particular systemic problem of delay in youth proceedings, there was no
need to create a new set of rules. Instead, the fact that the defendant was a youth
would be a case-speciﬁc factor which might mean that stays would be less rare in
such cases. But in this case, where the total time was 18 months and 26 days before
sentencing on charges including aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for
a dangerous purpose were laid in 2015 when K.J.M. was 15, the Court attributed two
months or so to defence delay, and no stay was needed. Both of Moldaver J.’s
co-writers from Jordan, Brown and Karakatsanis JJ., dissented, raising the question
of whether Jordan was assigned to these co-writers in an effort to build consensus
among similar but not identical views, especially given Karakatsanis J.’s concerns
about how Moldaver J.’s reasons heighten Jordan’s defence initiative requirements.
Justices Abella and Brown, writing together (Martin J. concurring), would have
set a 15-month presumptive ceiling for youth, focusing on a number of concerns
including the lack of attention to youth proceedings in Jordan, clear indications that
Parliament intended to separate the youth and adult systems and that in fact using
the Jordan rules might afford youth less protection than they otherwise had against
delay. Justice Karakatsanis did not agree with Abella and Brown JJ. that a speciﬁc
test for youth should be developed. Instead, she held that Jordan should be
“adapted” to meet the YCJA, the text of which calls particular attention to the need
for timeliness in the context of youth proceedings.57 Where her departure from the
majority becomes acute, as described above, is in the application of Jordan to
K.J.M.’s case.58 Her dissent argues that stays below the ceiling in the youth context
“will not be ‘rare’ or limited to ‘clear cases’” and, unlike the majority (which made
the same claim), her decision follows through.59
54

[2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).

55

S.C. 2002, c. 1 [hereinafter “YCJA”].

56

R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55, at para. 4 (S.C.C.).

57

R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55, at para. 208 (S.C.C.), per
Karakatsanis J., dissenting.
58
R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55, at para. 220 (S.C.C.), per
Karakatsanis J., dissenting.
59

R. v. M. (K.J.), [2019] S.C.J. No. 55, 2019 SCC 55, at para. 78 (S.C.C.) (“While stays
below the ceiling may be ‘rare’ when considered against the entire body of applications for
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VI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
After opening with Frank, the year closed with perhaps the most anticipated set
of cases in some time, the Vavilov trilogy. As discussed in this volume by Macklin,
Daly and Sossin, the cases focused on the standard of review and the Court had
signalled that the decisions would attempt to clarify and simplify the framework set
out in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,60 which had long been considered overly
complex and difficult to apply.61
In Vavilov, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. wrote joint concurring reasons, although
the “concurring” masks a quite fundamental disagreement. Justices Abella and
Karakatsanis, in a concurrence of 145 paragraphs, decry the majority’s lack of
ﬁdelity to the culture of deference developed in Canadian administrative law over
the past 40 years:
[T]he majority advocates a profoundly different philosophy of administrative law
than the one which has guided our Court’s jurisprudence for the last four decades.
The majority’s reasons are an encomium for correctness and a eulogy for
deference.62

Then, from paragraphs 254 to 278, this concurrence pulls out all the stops in
laying out the harms of the majority position. All apex courts understand how
“[r]espect for precedent . . . safeguards this Court’s institutional legitimacy”63 so
“the unprecedented wholesale rejection of an entire body of jurisprudence . . . is
particularly unsettling”.64 The majority decision brings “chaos” because it can only
“undermine legal certainty”.65 One might well ask where they concur! The answer
is limited to “eliminating the category of ‘true questions of jurisdiction’ and
foreclosing the use of the contextual factors identiﬁed in Dunsmuir” and, of course,
how this should apply to Mr. Vavilov.66
a stay under the ceiling, they may be less ‘rare’ when considered against the smaller body of
youth applications for a stay under the ceiling” [emphasis in original]).
60

[2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.).

61

Audrey Macklin, “Seven Out of Nine Legal Experts Agree: Expertise No Longer
Matters (in the Same Way) after Vavilov!” in this volume; Paul Daly, “Vavilov and the
Culture of Justiﬁcation in Contemporary Administrative Law” in this volume; Lorne Sossin,
“The Impact of Vavilov: Reasonableness and Vulnerability” in this volume.
62

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 201 (S.C.C.), Abella and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring.
63

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 261 (S.C.C.), per Abella and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring.
64
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 267 (S.C.C.).
65

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
2019 SCC 65, at para. 270 (S.C.C.).
66

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65,
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In Bell and NFL,67 the companion decisions in which correctness review is
applied, the concurrence turns into a joint dissent. This shift on the part of Abella
and Karakatsanis JJ. supports the conclusion reached by some scholars: while
Vavilov does provide some much-needed clarity, Bell and NFL illustrates the
signiﬁcance of the “judicial attitude” of the Court doing the application.68 While
Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. point to a multitude of factors that ought to support an
attitude of deference toward the CRTC, the majority ﬁnds the CRTC decision
unreasonable, and accordingly substitutes their own interpretation. But there might
be more in the switch. While some identify the approach of the majority in Vavilov
as a conservative approach,69 Macklin’s contribution to this volume illustrates the
complications of dichotomizing views about judicial review in the context of the
breadth of the administrative state. Macklin addresses the bifurcation of the
administrative law, into some ﬁelds where there are “competent, expert and
dispassionate administrative actors” and others were there are “inexpert or simply
under-resourced decision-makers”.70 This bifurcation largely maps onto a division
between ﬁeld of administrative law “regulating marginalized populations” and those
that do not:
2019 SCC 65, at para. 282 (S.C.C.), Abella and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring.
67
Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 66, 2019 SCC 66
(S.C.C.).
68

See Mary Liston, “Bell is the Tell I’m Thinking of” (Guest Post) (April 29, 2020), Paul
Daly, Administrative Law Matters (blog), online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.
com/blog/2020/04/29/bell-is-the-tell-im-thinking-of-mary-liston/>,
 quoting either Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, at para. 48 (S.C.C.)
(“Deference is both an attitude of the court and a requirement of the law of judicial review”)
or Abella and Karakatsanis JJ., concurring in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] S.C.J. No. 65, 2019 SCC 65, at paras. 288 and 294 (S.C.C.)
(“Deference, however, does not require reviewing courts to shirk their obligation to review
the decision. So long as they maintain a respectful attitude, frame the judicial review inquiry
properly and demand compelling justiﬁcation for quashing a decision, reviewing courts are
entitled to meaningfully probe an administrative decision. A thorough evaluation by a
reviewing court is not ‘disguised correctness review’, as some have used the phrase.
Deference, after all, stems from respect, not inattention to detail”).
69
See Mary Liston, “Bell is the Tell I’m Thinking of” (Guest Post) (April 29, 2020), Paul
Daly, Administrative Law Matters (blog), online: <https://www.administrativelawmatters.
com/blog/2020/04/29/bell-is-the-tell-im-thinking-of-mary-liston/>:
 “But it [sic] hard not to
look at the political currents from the south and see that they have been imported into Bell:
the libertarian attack on the administrative state, demands to roll back Chevron deference, and
renewed calls for a revived and enhanced non-delegation doctrine to ensure non-arbitrary
grants of power to administrative decisionmakers. . . . [I]t may be that the economic power
of the private sphere and its proﬁt motives ultimately won the day with the invalidation of the
CRTC’s decision” [footnotes omitted].
70

Audrey Macklin, “Seven Out of Nine Legal Experts Agree: Expertise No Longer
Matters (in the Same Way) after Vavilov!” in this volume.
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As a result lawyers who work for marginalized people might ﬁnd themselves in
common cause with a completely different group of legal actors calling for more
robust judicial review -those with “a principled objection to a pluralist vision of the
rule of law, or an ideological antipathy toward the redistributive dimensions of the
modern administrative state.”71

Obviously, we might say the same about judges. Justices Abella and Karakatsanis
do seem strange bedfellows for the Vavilov majority. But Vavilov’s case involved
clear indications that the adjudicator did not understand the signiﬁcance of some
aspects of the case and the full context of the statute in question. Immigration law
is an administrative decision-making context relatively notorious for being hostile to
those that come before it. Bell and NFL, in contrast, involved a highly sophisticated
decision-maker which had devoted considerable time to the particular questions in
the case, including holding public consultations. Yet the Vavilov framework, as
applied by the majority, overturned both decisions.
VII. BEYOND

THE

JUDGMENTS, BEHIND

THE

CURTAIN?

Having dispensed with the cases, and referred to the other judgments in this
volume which take them up in more detail, I now move beyond the judgments
released. In 2019, a series of developments highlighted the efforts of the Wagner
Court to shape and solidify its reputation and legitimacy in the eyes of the Canadian
public. Last year, Jamie Cameron wrote about the new Chief Justice’s commitment
to transparency, and there have certainly been more than a few mentions of that
word.72 There was a road trip, the creation of an annual “Year in Review” report
from the Court, and ﬁnally the complex events of May 2019 just prior to the
retirement of Gascon J. Taken together, these illustrate an institution relying on
71
Audrey Macklin, “Seven Out of Nine Legal Experts Agree: Expertise No Longer
Matters (in the Same Way) after Vavilov!” in this volume, under the heading “strange
bedfellows”.
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court nominees, citing transparency” The Globe and Mail (August 9, 2019), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-we-have-nothing-to-hide-chief-justicewagner-advocates-for-more/>;
 Sean Fine, “Chief Justice Richard Wagner promises new era
of transparency for Supreme Court” The Globe and Mail (February 1, 2018), online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/new-chief-justice-richard-wagner-spellingout-court-decisions-for-the-masses/article37827572/>;
 Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks
by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, “Official Welcome
Ceremony for the New Chief Justice” (February 5, 2018), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/
judges-juges/spe-dis/rw-2018-02-05-eng.aspx>;
 Cristin Schmitz, “Chief Justice Wagner improves public communication, brings new ideas, change to top court, CJC and NJI” The
Lawyer’s Daily (February 7, 2019), online: <https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/10165/
chief-justice-wagner-improves-public-communication-brings-new-ideas-change-to-top-courtcjc-and-nji>;
 Leslie MacKinnon, “Chief justice wants to make courts more open and
transparent” iPolitics (June 22, 2018), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2018/06/22/chief-justicewants-to-make-courts-more-open-and-transparent/>.
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sometimes sophisticated and sometimes almost clumsy methods to connect with
some form of “public” and to inﬂuence the way the Court is perceived. The public
is invited to have access, but the Court then has to decide where the lines to that
access must be drawn, and the new ventures move far beyond the rather staid Twitter
account opened in 2015 and the curious example of Amicus, the Supreme Court of
Canada’s owl mascot.73 Sounding in different registers, the trip, the report and the
news releases related to Gascon J. illustrate a Court trying to shape its image through
more than just judgments, to maintain legitimacy in an age where calculated forms
of access “behind closed doors” is a commonplace of celebrity.74
VIII. A ROAD TRIP FOR

THE

COURT

Everything about the hearings held in Winnipeg suggests that this was a trial
balloon for a program that would continue. Every year, a different city!75 What will
happen to that plan now that COVID-19 has arrived is unclear. But in his
introductory speech, the Chief Justice described why he thought it was important to
hold these hearings outside of Ottawa:
At the Supreme Court, our essential task is to make independent and impartial
decisions about issues that matter to Canadians ... we clarify the law for everyone.
That is why it is important that people understand how and why a given decision
was reached. It is hard to have faith in something if you don’t understand it. This
is why I believe it is so important for people to see how the justice system works,
in person, as those in the public gallery will today.76
73

Supreme Court of Canada @SCC_eng, “He’s looking forward to ten more years
meeting Canadians at the Court!” (January 18, 2019 at 3:25 p.m.), online: <https://twitter.
com/SCC_eng/status/1086358923362344961>
 (Supreme Court tweet announcing that Amicus will be celebrating his 10th birthday in 2019, also includes line drawing and photograph
of Amicus in the courtroom).
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See, e.g., Olga Frishman, “Court-Audience Relationships in the 21st Century” (2017)
86:2 Miss. L.J. 213-272 (Frishman explores “methods courts use to communicate with their
audiences that are not part of their official roles” at 215).
75
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not. See: Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C.,
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outside of Ottawa” (September 25, 2019), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spedis/rw-2019-09-25-1-eng.aspx>;
 Supreme Court of Canada, Remarks by the Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, “Meet the Judges: Get to Know Your
Supreme Court” (September 25, 2019), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/spe-dis/
rw-2019-09-25-2-eng.aspx>.
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Later, in a “meet the judges” session at the Museum of Human Rights, the Chief
Justice repeated many of these phrases, adding,
It is hard to trust a decision maker if you don’t know who they are. This is why I
believe it is so important to show you how our justice system works, and who
judges are, up close, and in person.
That is why my colleagues and I are here today. That is why we are hearing cases
for the ﬁrst time ever outside of Ottawa. We want you to see and understand what
we do. Being here in Winnipeg makes it a little easier for you to see your highest
court in person. Since my appointment as Chief Justice, one of my main priorities
has been to make the Court more open and accessible to all Canadians. Not just
legal professionals or people who happen to live in Ottawa. Everyone.77

These are fairly remarkable statements. The road trip was described as part of a
“continuing commitment to increasing access to justice”.78 But in these passages,
the emphasis was on seeing and through seeing, understanding. Setting aside for the
moment the question of whether an appellate hearing is a good illustration of “how
our justice system works” (let alone one that will be meaningful for most
non-lawyers), I want to focus on the emphasis on seeing the judges “in person”. In
these passages, and on the Winnipeg trip, this meant that both the judges and the
observing “small c” citizen are there “in real life”.79 But why does the “person” of
any individual judge matter to the public? And why should that part of the public’s
interest, in turn, matter to the Court? Judicial authority, historically, is usually
attached to and predicated on the authority and prestige of the role and not the
person. That is, scholars have often pointed to the elaborate trappings of judges and
judging, robes and wigs literally, and unique procedures ﬁguratively concealing the
fact that judges are individuals who have been invested with tremendous power by
the state and are signiﬁcantly unaccountable for the exercise of that power. Given
that part of how legitimacy has been maintained, what exactly does a court mean
when it wants you to meet a judge “up close and in person”? What is the mischief
to prevent, the goal to attain through this meeting?
The Chief Justice’s repetition of the phrase “It is hard to have faith in something
if you don’t understand it” invites us to ask about the choice of the words “faith” and
“understanding”. Does faith come from understanding? If so, what is the public to
understand?80 The Chief Justice spoke of “understanding the how and why of
77
Supreme Court of Canada, Speech by Richard Wagner, “Meet the Judges: Get to Know
Your Supreme Court” (25 September 2019), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/review-revue/
2019/index-eng.aspx>.
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decisions”, but also understanding the role of the court (“what we do”). Yet there is
no question that the general public will not understand “the how and why” of
decisions the way that trained students of law can.81 They are more likely to be
forced to take the Court’s version of “how and why” for granted. And the Chief
Justice seemed to treat the word “faith” as similar to the word “trust”, and saw trust
as based on “knowing” who the decision-makers are.
In assessing and analyzing these statements, we could look for evidence about
these two things, whether we trust decisions more when we know the decisionmakers, whether we trust more when we understand the how and why as explained
by the decision-maker. But we can also clearly imagine counter-examples, where
knowing the people and understanding the reasons could degrade trust. For instance,
knowing who the judges are is arguably more widespread in the U.S., through the
mechanism of Congressional conﬁrmation hearings which have long been a
well-watched spectacle. That example does not clearly show that introducing the
public to the judges would — in all contexts and across all kinds of introductions,
all judges and all audiences — produce trust. It is, perhaps, more accurate to say that
introductions carefully controlled by the Court itself, in service of its own legitimacy
and power, can be a useful tool in creating that trust.
In fact, it seems highly unlikely that bringing a lay public into a hearing of the
kind conducted at the Supreme Court would signiﬁcantly increase understanding of
the how and why of decisions. But on the other form of understanding, that is,
understanding the role of the Supreme Court, it seems clear that an explanation from
the Chief Justice of the role of the Court can be presented to the audience. In other
words, the lay public is not deducing, from the evidence of one speciﬁc hearing, the
role of the Court. Instead, they are being told, by the Chief Justice, what that role
is, how important it is, how much it matters, and how conscientiously and carefully
it is done. The Chief Justice at least partially anticipates the skepticism I am offering
here:
This isn’t because we want to be “popular.” Courts make decisions that are
deﬁnitely unpopular. It is an occupational hazard. We don’t need Canadians to love
us; trust me, we have thick skins. We can take it. But we do want you to understand
us – what our role is in Canadian society, what kind of work we do, and how that
work affects you.82
“Given that the law is a complex notion, what does public conﬁdence in a court demand?
Surely, it cannot be reduced to a matter for public relations experts, for that would imply that
judicial performance is but a show” (at 1622, citations omitted). In this piece, Reichman
concentrates on unpacking the notion of the “public” into a series of different practices or
audiences evaluating judicial performance using different values, symbols and languages.
81
I do not mean they will not understand. I mean that they are unlikely to understand in
the way that lawyers do, and, further, that judges are accustomed to writing for judges and
lawyers.
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Well, maybe they do not want to be popular, and the Chief Justice dropping the
puck at a hockey game between two Canadian teams is just a way of ﬁxing the Court
to other obviously bedrock Canadian things.83 Legitimacy is the term to focus on
here, and of course popularity is not the same. As any former high school student
knows, popularity may come and go. Legitimacy has more staying power.
IX. ANNUAL REPORTS AND OTHER TEXTS
Road trips are not the only way the Court is moving toward informing the public.
Another tradition revolving around “explaining” the work of the Court to the public
was inaugurated in 2019. The ﬁrst Year in Review report was released in April 2019
and covers the work of the Court during the 2018 calendar year. Slickly produced,
replete with purportedly candid photographs of the judges (robed and more casually
dressed, interacting in hallways, sitting around their case conference table, very
frequently smiling) and pages of infographics, the report is interesting beyond the
content. It seems to be written using the same guide to “reader friendliness” as the
plain-language summaries discussed below.
Among other things, the report provides an exhaustive form of metricization: pie
charts, line graphs, and other visual representations of the workload of the Court and
change over time. How many appeals were heard?84 In which areas of law?85 From
which provinces?86 How many decisions on leave to appeal?87 How many hearing
days per year?88 How long does a decision take?89 What it does not provide may
also be instructive. Unlike the Year in Review you are presently reading, the Court’s
report does not discuss how the Court split, or lined up in particular decisions (not
even on the page which brieﬂy summarizes “Notable Decisions”).90 All that is
Your Supreme Court” (25 September 2019), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/review-revue/
2019/index-eng.aspx>.
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offered is a bar graph illustrating the number of unanimous versus split decisions,
since 2009, ranging from a high of 79 per cent unanimity in 2014 to a low of 48 per
cent in 2018.91 The 2019 Year in Review (released in April 2020) is very similar. It
features a mass of candid photographs from the trip to Winnipeg, including a
double-page spread of the Chief Justice dropping the puck at a game between the
NHL’s Calgary Flames and Winnipeg Jets.92
If the road trip is best understood as a public relations exercise, designed to
bolster or protect the Court’s institutional prestige and legitimacy, to generate faith
and trust and to allow the Court to put its own version of its role in front of the
public, the Year in Review document seems similar. It has perhaps a pinch more
substance albeit no personal touch. In contrast, we have the “reader-friendly
summaries” initiative. Often referred to as plain-language summaries, the Court’s
“Cases in Brief” resource was launched in March 2018 with R. v. Carson.93 These
Briefs offer a plain-language tour of the majority decision in each and every case.
In March 2020, the Court began surveying users of the Cases in Brief. The
questions from this survey suggest what the Court was trying to do with these
summaries.94 For instance, the survey asks many questions about who is reading the
summaries and why, questions which clearly indicate that the Court suspects that
many readers are not just “interested members of the public” but lawyers, law
students, and others who work in the legal ﬁeld. Amusingly (who answers no?), the
survey asks “In general, do you ﬁnd reading legal texts difficult?”. But a series of
questions suggests what they are hoping to do with the Cases in Brief: use easy
vocabulary and sentence structure; provide good explanations of legal concepts;
provide accurate descriptions of the decisions. Given the Court’s approach to
openness, it seems very likely that they will be publishing the results (the online
survey does not indicate when it will close).
Although there are suggestions that the target audience for the briefs are the
general public, rather than the professional media, work by Schneiderman (in the
Canadian context) and Moran (in the U.K.) on the relationship between the media
and the courts suggests that we should understand the briefs as another way of
attempting to shape public opinion about the Supreme Court.95 In particular,
91
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Moran’s work on the role of Judicial Press Officers in the U.K. focused on how the
media report about decisions and trials or appeals is helpful in thinking about how
the court as an institution might be attempting to manage reporting.96 These briefs
can be considered yet another way of inﬂuencing the way Canadians learn about the
Supreme Court and its work.
X. LEAVING

THE

COURT

There is one further illustration of the Court’s approach to public relations and
transparency from 2019, and it is by far the most difficult to write about. On the
evening of May 8, 2019, the Ottawa Police Service asked for the public’s help in
locating Justice Clement Gascon, saying his family was concerned about his
well-being. He was last seen in the early afternoon, near the Court’s location at Kent
and Wellington. At the time, he was 59 years old and had been serving on the
Supreme Court since June 2014. In fact, he had already announced his intention to
retire from the Court September 15, 2019, for “personal and family reasons”.97
Hours after issuing the public appeal, the police tweeted that Gascon J. had been
found “safe and sound”.98
The following day, the Chief Justice thanked the Ottawa police in a statement,99
and the Executive Legal Officer, Renée Thériault, told the press:
Judicial Press Officers” (2014) 4:4 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 799-818; Leslie J. Moran,
“Managing the ‘Critical Interdependencies’ of the Media and Judiciary in the UK” in Michael
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Out of respect for Justice Gascon’s privacy, I can’t tell you why he was absent, but
I can say that we have full conﬁdence it doesn’t affect his ability to carry out his
duties at the court.

This story, already surprising enough, took another turn the following week, when
Gascon J. issued a statement through the Supreme Court. In the English version of
the short document, he wrote:
I understand and accept that, because of my role as a judge of the Supreme Court
of Canada, it is incumbent on me to offer certain explanations. They are as follows.
For over twenty years, I have been dealing with a sometimes insidious illness:
depression and anxiety disorders. This is an illness that can be treated and
controlled, some days better than others. On the afternoon of Wednesday, May 8,
affected both by the recent announcement of a difficult and heart-rending career
decision and by a change in medication, I conducted myself in an unprecedented
and unaccustomed manner by going out without warning and remaining out of
touch for several hours. I can neither explain nor justify what I understand to have
been a panic attack, and I wish to apologize most profusely to all those who suffered
as a result. This health issue has been taken care of and treated with the necessary
medical support. I conﬁrm that I am in good health, and am fully capable of
performing my duties as a judge.
I wish to thank my family, my colleagues, my friends and all the others who have
supported me through this trying time. Although I know that I cannot erase what
happened, I wish to put it behind me and look ahead. I have learned important
lessons from it and will continue to do so over time, and with the necessary patience
and assistance on which I know I can count.100

This statement prompted an outpouring in traditional and social media of support for
Gascon J., with many describing his statement as “brave”.101 Inevitably, comparisons with the treatment of Justice Le Dain in 1988 were raised.102 As revealed in a
2018 CBC radio documentary, Le Dain J. was removed from the Supreme Court
(and erased from the record of some cases he heard and participated in) after his
wife requested he be granted leave and revealed to then Chief Justice Brian Dickson
that Le Dain was suffering from depression.103 The public institutional behaviour of
the 2019 Court was diametrically opposed to the situation of Le Dain J. The Chief
Justice stood by Gascon J. The Court robustly agreed that he was able to carry out
100
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his duties, and on his last hearing day, he was warmly feted by the Court.104
Justice Gascon’s statement may well have been brave. But the text of the news
release also suggests that his was in some sense a compelled revelation. In the
English version, the word “incumbent” is used, a word that suggests a duty to
disclose the nature of his illness rather than a decision to do so. He both
“understands” and “accepts” this duty.105 He agrees it exists and he agrees to
discharge it, in a statement released by his employer.
A ﬁnal relevant consideration is that the incident, and the statement, both reached
the public in the same month as Gascon J.’s last hearing date.106 By mentioning this
I am not suggesting that the Court as an institution, or the Chief Justice in his role
or as a person, somehow failed to support Gascon J. properly. Rather, I mention the
timing to point out that really we learn very little about how the Court accommodates or does not accommodate any mental illness among the judges. We learn less
about how the Court would approach such a situation than we do about the Court’s
approach to what should be known about judges. If there is, indeed, a form of duty
to disclose medical diagnoses created out of this event, what is the justiﬁcation for
that? What does it mean that Gascon J. was either urged, required or encouraged to
consider it part of his duty as a judge to explain his “disappearance”, a matter of
mere hours in which he walked the streets of Ottawa. This, it seems to me, genuinely
does represent something new, and it is consistent with the sentiments expressed by
the Chief Justice in his “road trip” speeches, with the incessant invocation of
transparency and with something that has clearly shifted starting with the McLachlin
Court. That is, we, the public (or publics) are entitled to know “who judges are, up
close, and in person”, and this knowing apparently includes knowing about medical
crises and medication use, even when the judge in question is less than one week
from retirement. There is a relationship between being brave and fulﬁlling duties
and responsibility to be sure, and none of this commentary should suggest that
104
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Gascon J. was not courageous in his approach at the time or since.107 Instead, I am
asking whether in fact he was duty-bound to issue that statement, and if so, why?
Judges have always sought to control the way they are seen by the public.
Fantastic garb, unique forms of address, courtrooms of a majestic scale and décor,
rituals of proceeding that are often archaic, complex and mysterious, all serve to
illustrate the separation of judges and judging from ordinary human activity, to
ensure that the public understands judges as different from mere mortals. What is
important, in these rituals, is the role, the position, the power — not the person. Yet,
as scholars such as Moran have pointed out, this general rule has come under some
pressure in the more recent past. For instance, his study of judicial portraiture clearly
describes the increasing depiction of personal details in official judicial portraiture
(whether painted or photographed). This goes beyond the ways that, for instance,
bewigged judges who are all white and male look extremely similar in portraits, and
includes the objects appearing in the portraits, the poses allowed, the scope of the
portrait (beyond the headshot) and even the style of painting.108 Moran, along with
others, has extended his study to the contemporary relationship between the news
media and the judiciary, describing it as a “critical interdependency” (riffing on the
words of England’s then Lord Chief Justice Judge in a 2011 Keynote address,
describing the independence of the media and the independence of the judiciary as
“critical independences”).109
Moran’s work, along with earlier work by Schneiderman in the Canadian context,
may be useful in thinking through recent efforts by the Supreme Court of Canada to
reach the public. The road trip, the reader-friendly summaries and the story of
Gascon J. in May 2019 all suggest an increasing effort to reach a lay public, and the
ﬁrst and last, at least, seem to place an interesting emphasis on the speciﬁc
individual identities of the judges. What is the Court responding to in taking these
initiatives? How do these relate to, for instance, the new procedures and controversies around selection of judges for the Supreme Court? What about the curious
incident involving the denial and then granting of leave to multiple would be
107
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interveners in TWU?110 Are these new initiatives reﬂected in Canada’s lower
courts? Without taking our eye off this year’s doctrinal developments, I think that we
can and should consider these questions to be critically important in understanding
the contemporary Supreme Court of Canada.
110

See, e.g., Alice Woolley, “The Unfortunate Incident of the TWU Intervention
Decisions” ABLAWG (September 7, 2017), online: <https://ablawg.ca/2017/09/07/theunfortunate-incident-of-the-twu-intervention-decisions/>;
 Supreme Court of Canada, “News
Release” (August 2, 2017), online: <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/5590/
index.do>.
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